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ABSTRACT
Online social networks are being increasingly used for an-
alyzing various societal phenomena such as epidemiology,
information dissemination, marketing and sentiment flow.
Popular analysis techniques such as clustering and influen-
tial node analysis, require the computation of eigenvectors of
the real graph’s adjacency matrix. Recent de-anonymization
attacks on Netflix and AOL datasets show that an open ac-
cess to such graphs pose privacy threats. Among the various
privacy preserving models, Differential privacy provides the
strongest privacy guarantees.
In this paper we propose a privacy preserving mechanism
for publishing social network graph data, which satisfies dif-
ferential privacy guarantees by utilizing a combination of
theory of random matrix and that of differential privacy.
The key idea is to project each row of an adjacency matrix
to a low dimensional space using the random projection ap-
proach and then perturb the projected matrix with random
noise. We show that as compared to existing approaches for
differential private approximation of eigenvectors, our ap-
proach is computationally efficient, preserves the utility and
satisfies differential privacy. We evaluate our approach on
social network graphs of Facebook, Live Journal and Pokec.
The results show that even for high values of noise variance
σ = 1 the clustering quality given by normalized mutual in-
formation gain is as low as 0.74. For influential node discov-
ery, the propose approach is able to correctly recover 80% of
the most influential nodes. We also compare our results with
an approach presented in [43], which directly perturbs the
eigenvector of the original data by a Laplacian noise. The
results show that this approach requires a large random per-
turbation in order to preserve the differential privacy, which
leads to a poor estimation of eigenvectors for large social
networks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivation
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become an essential
part of modern life. Billions of users connect and share infor-
mation using OSNs such as Facebook and Twitter. Graphs
obtained from these OSNs can provide useful insights on
various fundamental societal phenomena such as epidemi-
ology, information dissemination, marketing, and sentiment
flow [1,8,16,35,36]. Various analysis methods [6,9,15,26,28]
have been applied to OSNs by explicitly exploring its graph
structure, such as clustering analysis for automatically iden-
tifying online communities and node influence analysis for
recognizing the influential nodes in social networks. The
basis of all these analysis is to represent a social network
graph by an adjacency matrix and then represent individual
nodes by vectors derived from the top eigenvectors of the
adjacency matrix. Thus, all these analysis methods require
real social network graphs.
Unfortunately, OSNs often refuse to publish their social
network graphs due to privacy concerns. Social network
graphs contain sensitive information about individuals such
as an user’s topological characteristics in a graph (e.g., num-
ber of social ties, influence in a community, etc). From the
user perspective, the sensitive information revealed from a
social network graph can be exploited in many ways such
as the propagation of malware and spam [41]. From the
OSN perspective, disclosing sensitive user information put
them in the risk of violating privacy laws. A natural way
to bridge the gap is to anonymize original social network
graphs (by means such as removing identifiers) and pub-
lish the anonymized ones. For example, Netflix published
anonymized movie ratings of 500,000 subscribers and AOL
published search queries of 658,000 users [19, 32]. However,
such anonymization is vulnerable to privacy attacks [2, 33]
where attackers can identify personal information by linking
two or more separately innocuous databases. For example,
recently, de-anonymization attacks were successful on Net-
flix and AOL datasets, which resulted in Netflix and AOL
being sued [19,32].
1.2 Problem Statement
In this paper, we aim to develop a scheme for publishing
social network graphs with differential privacy guarantees.
The concept of differential privacy was raised in the context
of statistical database, where a trusted party holds a dataset
D containing sensitive information (e.g. medical records)
and wants to publish a dataset D′ that provides the same
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global statistical information as D while preserving the pri-
vacy information of each individual user. Recently, differen-
tial privacy has become the widely accepted criteria for pri-
vacy preserving data publishing because it provides robust
privacy guarantees for publishing sensitive data [10–12].
This privacy preserving social graph publishing scheme
should satisfy the following two requirements. First, the
published data should maintain the utility of the original
data. As many analysis of social networks are based on
the top eigenvectors of the adjacency matrices derived from
social networks, the utility of the published data will be
measured by how well the top eigenvectors of the published
data can be approximated to the eigenvectors of the orig-
inal data. Second, the scheme should achieve the desired
privacy guarantees, i.e., an adversary should learn nothing
more about any individual from the published data, regard-
less of the presence or absence of an individual’s record in
the data. We emphasize that these two goals are often con-
flicting: to preserve the differential privacy of individuals, a
sufficiently large amount of random noise has to be added to
the published data, which could potentially result in a large
error in approximating the top eigenvectors of the original
data. Our goal is to achieve a best tradeoff between privacy
and utility.
1.3 Limitations of Prior Art
A few schemes have been developed to approximate eigen-
vectors and eigenvalues of matrices in a differential private
manner [20] [7, 24]. Their main idea is to perturb the origi-
nal matrices by adding random noise and then publish the
perturbed matrices. The key limitation of this approach is
that given n users in the social network, they have to publish
a large dense matrix of size n× n, leading to a high cost in
both computation and storage space. Recently, Wang et al.
proposed to perturb the eigenvectors of the original matri-
ces by adding random noises and then publish the perturbed
eigenvectors [43]. If we are interested in the first k eigenvec-
tors of the adjacency matrix, where k  n, we only need to
publish a matrix of size n × k. Although this reduces com-
putation cost and storage space, it requires a large amount
of random perturbation in order to preserve differential pri-
vacy, which leads to poor estimation of eigenvectors for large
social networks.
1.4 Proposed Approach
We propose a random matrix approach to address the
above limitations by leveraging the theories of random ma-
trix and differential privacy. Our key idea is to first project
each row of an adjacency matrix into a low dimensional
space using random projection, and then perturb the pro-
jected matrix with random noise, and finally publish the
perturbed and projected matrix. The random projection is
critical in our approach. First, it reduces the dimensionality
of the matrix to be published, avoiding the difficulty of pub-
lishing a large dense matrix. Second, according to the theory
of random matrix [18], the random projection step allows us
to preserve the top eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix.
Third, the random projection step by itself has the ability
of achieving differential privacy, which makes it possible to
ensure differential privacy in the second step by introducing
a small random perturbation [3, 34].
1.5 Validation of Proposed Approach
To validate our differential private random matrix ap-
proach and to illustrate the utility preservation of eigen-
spectrum, we perform experiments over graphs obtained
from Facebook, Live Journal and Pokec social networks. We
analyze the impact of perturbation by evaluating the utility
of the published data for two different applications which
require spectral information of a graph. First, we consider
clustering of social networks, which has been widely used
for community detection in social networks. We choose spec-
tral clustering algorithm in our study, which depends on the
eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix. Next, we examine the
problem of identifying the ranks of influential nodes in a
social network graph.
1.6 Key Contributions
We make three key contributions in this paper. First, we
propose a random projection approach which utilizes ran-
dom matrix theory to reduce the dimensions of the adja-
cency matrix and achieves differential privacy by adding
small amount of noise. As online social networks consists
of millions or even billions of nodes, it is crucial to minimize
computational cost and storage space. The dimensionality
reduction reduces the computational cost of the algorithm
and small noise addition maintains the utility of the data.
Second, we formally prove that our scheme achieves differ-
ential privacy. We also provide theoretical error bounds for
approximating top−k eigenvectors. Finally, we perform eval-
uation by analyzing the utility of the published data for
two different applications which require spectral informa-
tion of a graph. We consider clustering of social networks
and the problem of identifying the ranks of influential nodes
in a social network graph. We also compare our results with
an approach presented in [43], which directly perturbs the
eigenvector of the original data by a Laplacian noise.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Differential Privacy
The seminal work of D. Work et. al [10], on differential
privacy provides formal privacy guarantees that do not de-
pend on an adversary’s background knowledge. The notion
of differential privacy was developed through a series of re-
search work presented in [4, 14, 27]. Popular differential pri-
vate mechanisms which are used in publishing sensitive data
include Laplace mechanism [14] and the Exponential mech-
anism [30]. Several other mechanisms have been proposed, a
general overview of the research work on differential privacy
can be found in [3, 13].
2.2 Differential Privacy in Social Networks
Many efforts have been made towards publishing differen-
tial private graph data. A work presented in [37] seeks a solu-
tion to share meaningful graph datasets, based on dk−graph
model, while preserving differential privacy. Another work in
preserving the degree distribution of a social network graph
is presented in [21]. In [31], differential privacy on a graph
is guaranteed by perturbing Kronecker model parameters.
In [27], the authors developed a differential private algo-
rithm that preserves distance between any two samples in a
given database. Although these studies deal with differential
private publication of social network data, none of them ad-
dress the utility of preserving the eigenvectors of the graph,
the central theme of this work.
Recently, several algorithms were proposed, mostly in the-
oretical community, for publishing a differential private copy
of the data that preserves the top eigenvectors of the original
dataset. In [4], the authors propose to publish the covariance
matrix of the original data contaminated by random noise.
In [3, 34], the authors show that random projection by it-
self can preserve both the differential privacy and the eigen
spectrum of a given matrix provided appropriate modifica-
tion is made to the original matrix. In [34], the authors also
present a randomized response approach which achieves the
preservation of differential privacy and top eigenvectors by
inverting each feature attribute with a fixed probability. The
main drawback of applying these approaches to social net-
work analysis is their high demand in both computation and
storage space. In particular, all these approaches require, ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly, generating a large dense matrix
of size n × n, where n is the number of users in the net-
work. For a social network of 10 million users, they need to
manipulate a matrix of size 1014, which requires a storage
space of a few petabyes. In contrast, for the same social net-
work, if we assume most users have no more than 100 links,
the graph of social network can be represented by a sparse
matrix that consumes only several gigabytes memory.
Besides publishing a differential private copy of data, an
alternative approach is to publish differential privacy pre-
served eigenvectors. In [43], the authors propose to publish
eigenvectors perturbed by Laplacian random noise, which
unfortunately requires a large amount of random perturba-
tion for differential privacy preservation and consequentially
leads to a poor utility of data. An iterative algorithm was
proposed in [20] to compute differential private eigenvectors.
It generates large dense matrix of n × n at each iteration,
making it unsuitable for large-scale social network analysis.
Sampling approaches based on the exponential mechanism
are proposed in [7,24] for computing differential private sin-
gular vectors. Since these approaches require sampling very
high dimensional vectors from a random distribution, they
are computationally infeasible for large social networks.
3. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVATE PUBLICA-
TION OF SOCIAL NETWORK GRAPH
BY RANDOM MATRIX
In this section, we first present the proposed approach
for differential private publication of social network graph
based on the random matrix theory. We then present its
guarantee on differential privacy and the approximation of
eigenvectors.
Let G be a binary graph representing the connectivity of a
social network, and let A ∈ {0, 1}n×n be the adjacency ma-
trix representing the graph, where Ai,j = 1 if there is an edge
between nodes i and j, and Ai,j = 0, otherwise. By assuming
that the graph is undirected, A will be a symmetric matrix,
i.e. Ai,j = Aj,i for any i and j. The first step of our approach
is to generate two Gaussian random matrix P ∈ Rn×m and
Q ∈ Rm×m, where m n is the number of random projec-
tions. Here, each entry of P is sampled independently from
a Gaussian distribution N (0, 1/m), and each entry of Q is
sampled independently from another Gaussian distribution
N (0, σ2), where the value of σ will be discussed later. Us-
ing Gaussian random matrix P , we compute the projection
matrix Ap ∈ Rn×m by Ap = A × P , which projects each
row of A from a high dimensional space Rn to into a low
dimensional space Rm. We then perturb Ap with the Gaus-
sian random matrix Q by Â = Ap+Q, and publish Â to the
external world. Algorithm 1 highlights the key steps of the
proposed routine for publishing the social network graph.
Compared to the existing approaches for differential private
publication of social network graphs, the proposed algorithm
is advantageous in three aspects:
• The proposed algorithm is computationally efficient as
it does not require either storing or manipulating a
dense matrix of n× n.
• The random projection matrix P allows us to preserve
the top eigenvectors of A due to the theory of random
matrix.
• It is the joint effort between the random projection
P and the random perturbation Q that leads to the
preservation of differential privacy. This unique fea-
ture allows us to introduce a small amount of random
perturbation for differential privacy preservation, thus
improving the utility of data.
Algorithm 1: Â = Publish(A,m, σ2)
Input: (1) symmetric adjacency matrix A ∈ Rn×n
(2) the number of random projections m < n
(3) variance for random noise σ2
Output: Â
1 Compute a random projection matrix P , with
Pi,j ∼ N (0, 1/m)
2 Compute a random perturbation matrix Q, with
Qi,j ∼ N (0, σ2)
3 Compute the projected matrix Ap = AP
4 Compute the randomly perturbed matrix Â = Ap +Q
3.1 Theoretical Analysis
In this section we give a theoretical analysis of two main
aspects of publishing differential private graph of social net-
works. First, we prove theoretically that using random ma-
trix for publishing social network graphs guarantees differ-
ential privacy. Next we give theoretical error bounds for ap-
proximating top−k eigenvectors.
3.1.1 Theoretical Guarantee on Differential Privacy
Before we show the guarantee on differential privacy, we
first introduce the definition of differential privacy.
Definition 3.1. (, δ)-Differential Privacy: A (random-
ized) algorithm A satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy, if for all
inputs X and X0 differing in at most one user’s one attribute
value, and for all sets of possible outputs D ⊆ Range(A),
we have
Pr (A(X) ∈ D) ≤ e Pr (A(X0) ∈ D) + δ, (1)
where the probability is computed over the random coin
tosses of the algorithm.
To understand the implication of (, δ)-differential privacy,
consider the database X ∈ {0, 1}n×m as a binary matrix.
Let pi,j := Pr(Xi,j = 1) represent the prior knowledge of
an attacker about X, and let p′i,j = Pr(Xi,j = 1|A(X))
represent his knowledge about X after observing the output
A(X) from algorithm A. Then, if an algorithm A satisfies
(, δ)-differential privacy, then with a probability 1 − δ, we
have, for any i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]∣∣ln pi,j − ln p′i,j∣∣ ≤ 
In other words, the additional information gained by ob-
serving A(X) is bounded by . Thus, parameter  > 0 deter-
mines the degree of differential privacy: the smaller the , the
less the amount of information will be revealed. Parameter
δ ∈ (0, 1) is introduced to account the rare events when the
two probabilities Pr (A(X) ∈ D) and Pr (A(X0) ∈ D) may
differ significantly from each other.
Theorem 1. Assuming δ < 1/2, n ≥ 2, and
σ ≥ 1

√
10
(
+ ln
1
2δ
)
ln
n
δ
Then, Algorithm 1 satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy w.r.t.
a change in an individual person’s attribute.
The detailed proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Section
3.1.3. The key feature of Theorem 1 is that the variance for
generating the random perturbation matrix Q is O(lnn),
almost independent from the size of social network. As a re-
sult, we can ensure differential privacy for the published Â
for a very large social network by only introducing a Gaus-
sian noise with small variance, an important feature that
allows us to simultaneously preserve both the utility and
differential privacy. Our definition of differential privacy is
a generalized version of -differential privacy which can be
viewed as (, 0)-differential privacy.
3.1.2 Theoretical Guarantee on Eigenvector Ap-
proximation
Let u1, . . . , un the eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix
A ranked in the descending order of eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λn.
Let k be the number of top eigenvectors of interests. Let
u˜1, . . . , u˜k be the first k eigenvectors of Â. Define the ap-
proximation error for the first k eigenvectors as
E2 = max
1≤i≤k
|ui − u˜i|2
Our goal is to show that the approximation error E2 will
be small when the number of random projections m is suf-
ficiently large.
Theorem 2. Assume (i) m ≥ c(k+k ln k), where c is an
universal constant given in [38], (ii) n ≥ 4(m + 1) ln(12m)
and (iii) λk − λk+1 ≥ 2σ
√
2n. Then, with a probability at
least 1/2, we have
E2 ≤ 16σ
2n
(λk − λk+1)2 +
32
λ2k
n∑
i=k+1
λ2i
The corollary below simplifies the result in Theorem 2 by
assuming that λk is significantly larger than the eigenvalues
λk+1, . . . , λn.
Corollary 3.1. Assume (i) λk = Θ(n/k), and (ii)∑n
i=k+1 λ
2
i = O(n). Under the same assumption for m and
n as Theorem 2, we have, with a probability at least 1/2,
E ≤ O
(
k
[
σ√
n
+
1√
n
])
As indicated by Theorem 2 and Corollary 3.1, under the
assumptions (i) λk is significantly larger than eigenvalues
λk+1, . . . , λn, (ii) the number of random projections m is
sufficiently larger than k, and (iii) n is significantly larger
than the number of random projections m, we will have
the approximation error E ∝ O(k/√n) in recovering the
eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix A. We also note that
according to Corollary 3.1, the approximation error is pro-
portional to σ, which measures the amount of random per-
turbation needed for differential privacy preservation. This
is consistent with our intuition, i.e. the smaller the random
perturbation, the more accurate the approximation of eigen-
vectors.
3.1.3 Proof of Theorem 1
To prove that Algorithm 1 is differential private, we need
the following theorem from [27]
Lemma 3.1. (Theorem 1 [27]) Define the `2-sensitivity of
the projection matrix P as w2(P ) = max
1≤i≤n
|Pi,∗|2, where Pi,∗
represents the ith row of matrix P . Assuming δ < 1/2, and
σ ≥ w2(P )

√
2
(
+ ln
1
2δ
)
Then Algorithm 1 satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy w.r.t. a
change in an individual person’s attribute.
In order to bound w2(P ), we rely on the following concen-
tration for χ2 distribution.
Lemma 3.2. (Tail bounds for the χ2 distribution ) Let
X1, . . . , Xd be independent draws from N (0, 1). Therefore,
for any 0 < δ < 1, we have, with a probability 1− δ,
d∑
i=1
X2i ≤ d+ 2
√
d ln
1
δ
+ 2 ln
1
δ
Define
z2i =
m∑
j=1
P 2i,j
Evidently, according to the definition of w22(P ), we have
w22(P ) = max
1≤i≤n
z2i
Since Pi,j ∼ N (0, 1/m), we have mz2i follow the χ2 dis-
tribution of d freedom. Using Lemma 2, we have, with a
probability 1− δ,
z2i ≤ 1 + 2
√
1
m
ln
1
δ
+
2
m
ln
1
δ
By taking the union bound, we have, with a probability 1−δ
w22(P ) = max
1≤i≤m
z2i ≤ 1 + 2
√
1
m
ln
n
δ
+
2
m
ln
n
δ
≤ 2 (2)
where the last inequality follows from m ≥ 4 ln(n/δ). We
complete the proof by combining the result from Lemma 1
and the inequality in (2).
3.1.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Let A ∈ Rn×n be the adjacency matrix, Ap = AP , and
Â = Ap + Q. Let û1, . . . , ûk be the first k eigenvectors of
matrix Ap. Define U = (u1, . . . ,uk), Û = (û1, . . . , ûk), and
U˜ = (u˜1, . . . , u˜k). For each of these matrices, we define a
projection operator, denoted by Pk, P̂k and P˜k, as
Pk =
k∑
i=1
uiu
>
i = UU
>
P̂k =
k∑
i=1
ûiû
>
i = Û Û
>
P˜k =
k∑
i=1
u˜iu˜
>
i = U˜ U˜
>
We first bound the approximation error E2 by the difference
between projection operators, i.e.
E2 = max
1≤i≤k
|ui − u˜i|2 ≤ ‖UU> − U˜ U˜>‖2 = ‖Pk − P˜k‖2
where ‖ · ‖2 stands for the spectral norm of matrix. Using
the fact that
E2 ≤ ‖Pk − P˜k‖22 = ‖Pk − P̂k + P̂k − P˜k‖22
≤ 2‖Pk − P̂k‖22 + 2‖Pk − P˜k‖22
≤ 2‖Pk − P̂k‖2F + 2‖Pk − P˜k‖22 (3)
where ‖ · ‖F stands for the Frobenius norm of matrix, below
we will bound ‖Pk − P̂k‖F and ‖Pk − P˜k‖F , separately.
To bound ‖Pk − P̂k‖F , we need the following theorem for
random matrix.
Lemma 3.3. (Theorem 14 [38]) Assume 0 <  ≤ 1 and
m ≥ c(k/ + k ln k), where c is some universal constant.
Then, with a probability at least 2/3, we have
‖A− P̂k(A)‖F ≤ (1 + )‖A− Pk(A)‖F ,
Since
‖A−P̂k(A)‖F≥−‖A−Pk(A)‖F+‖Pk(A)−P̂k(A)‖F
= −‖A−Pk(A)‖F−‖Pk(A)+P̂kPk(A)+P̂kPk(A)−P̂k(A)‖F
≥ −‖A−Pk(A)‖F+‖Pk(A)−P̂kPk(A)‖F−|P̂k(A−Pk(A))‖F
≥ ‖Pk(A)−P̂kPk(A)‖−2‖A−Pk(A)‖F>,
combining with the result from Lemma 3, we have, with a
probability at least 2/3,
‖(Pk − P̂kPk)(A)‖F ≤ (3 + )|A− Pk(A)|F (4)
Since
‖(Pk − P̂kPk)(A)‖F
= ‖(PkPk − P̂kPk)(A)‖F = ‖(Pk − P̂k)Pk(A)‖F
≥ ‖Pk − P̂k‖F ‖Pk(A)‖2 = λk‖Pk − P̂k‖F
combining with the inequality in (4), we have, with a prob-
ability at least 2/3,
‖Pk − P̂k‖F ≤ 3 + 
λk
|A− Pk(A)|F (5)
In order to bound ‖P̂k − P˜k‖2, we use the Davis-Kahan
sinΘ theorem given as below.
Lemma 3.4. Let A and A˜ be two symmetric matrices. Let
{ui}ki=1 and {u˜i}ki=1 be the first k eigenvectors of A and A˜,
respectively. Let λk(A) denote the kth eigenvalue of A. Then,
we have
‖Pk − P˜k‖2 ≤ ‖A− A˜‖2
λk(A)− λk+1(A˜)
if λk(A) > λk+1(A˜), where Pk =
∑k
i=1 uku
>
k and P˜k =∑k
i=1 u˜iu˜
>
i .
Using Lemma 4 and the fact
λk+1(Â) ≤ λk+1(Ap) + ‖Ap − Â‖2 = λk + ‖Q‖2
we have
‖P̂k − P˜k‖2 ≤ ‖Ap − Â‖2
λk(Ap)− λk+1(Â)
≤ ‖Q‖2
λk − λk+1 − ‖Q‖2
Under the assumption that λk − λk+1 ≥ 2‖Q‖2, we have
‖P̂k − P˜k‖2 ≤ 2‖Q‖2
λk − λk+1
In order to bound the spectral norm of Q, we need the fol-
lowing lemma from random matrix.
Lemma 3.5. Let A ∈ Rr×m be a standard Gaussian ran-
dom matrix. For any 0 <  ≤ 1/2, with a probability at least
1− δ, we have ∥∥∥∥ 1mAA> − I
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 
provided
m ≥ 4(r + 1)
2
ln
2r
δ
Using Lemma 5 and the fact that Qi,j ∼ N (0, σ2), we have,
with a probability at least 5/6
‖QQ>‖2 ≤ (1 + η)σ2n
where
n ≥ 4(m+ 1)
η2
ln(12m)
As a result, we have, with a probability at least 5/6,
‖Q‖2 ≤ σ
√
(1 + η)n
and therefore
‖P̂k − P˜k‖2 ≤ 2σ
λk − λk+1
√
(1 + η)n (6)
We complete the proof by combining the bounds for ‖Pk −
P̂k‖F and ‖P̂k− P˜k‖2 in (5) and (6) and plugging them into
the inequality in (3).
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our differential pri-
vate random matrix approach and to illustrate the util-
ity preservation of eigen-spectrum, we perform experiments
over graphs obtained from three different online social net-
works. We analyze the impact of perturbation by evaluating
the utility of the published data for two different applica-
tions which require spectral information of a graph. First,
Network Nodes Edges
Facebook 3, 097, 165 23, 667, 394
Pokec 1, 632, 803 30, 622, 564
LiveJournal 3, 997, 962 34, 681, 189
Table 1: Dataset Description
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Figure 1: Degree distribution of three datasets.
we consider clustering of social networks, which has been
widely used for community detection in social networks. We
choose spectral clustering algorithm in our study, which de-
pends on the eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix. Next, we
examine the problem of identifying the ranks of influential
nodes in a social network graph.
For the evaluation purposes, we obtain clusters and node
ranks from the published graph, and compare the results
against those obtained from the original graph. We give a
brief description of the results obtained for each of the ap-
plications of graph spectra in the subsequent sections.
4.1 Dataset
In our evaluation we use three different social network
graphs from Fcaebook, Live Journal and Pokec. We use the
Facebook data set collected by Wilson et al. from Facebook
[44]. The social graphs of Live Journal and Pokec were ob-
tained from publicly available SNAP graph library [39], [45].
The choice of these social networks is based on two main
requirements. First, the network should be large enough so
that it is a true representation of real online social structure.
A small network not only under-represents the social struc-
ture, but also produces biased results. Second, the number of
edges in the network should be sufficiently large in order to
reveal the interesting structure of the network. For all three
benchmark datasets, the ratio of the number of edges to the
number of nodes is between 7 and 20. Table 1 provides the
basic statistics of the social network graphs.
Figure 1 shows degree distribution of three online social
networks on log-log scale. We can see that the data follows
a power law distribution which is a characteristic of social
network degree distribution.
4.2 Spectral Clustering
Clustering is a widely used technique for identifying
groups of similar instances in a data. Clustering has appli-
cations in community detection, targeted marketing, bioin-
formatics etc. Social networks posses large amount of in-
formation which can be utilized in extensive data mining
applications. Large complex graphs can be obtained from so-
cial networks which represent relationships among individual
users. One of the key research questions is the understand-
ing of community structure present in large social network
graphs. Social networking platforms possess strong commu-
nity structure of users, which can be captured by clustering
nodes of a social network graph. Detecting communities can
help in identifying structural position of nodes in a com-
munity. Nodes with a central position in a community have
influence in the community. Similarly, nodes lying at the
intersection of two communities are important for maintain-
ing links between communities. Disclosure of the identity of
such nodes having important structural properties results in
serious privacy issues. Therefore, in order to protect an in-
dividual’s privacy it is crucial for data publishers to provide
rigorous privacy guarantees for the data to be published.
In our experiments, we use spectral clustering for evaluat-
ing our privacy-preserving random matrix approach. Spec-
tral clustering has many fundamental advantages over other
clustering algorithms [42]. Unlike other clustering algo-
rithms, spectral clustering is particularly suitable for social
networks, since it requires an adjacency matrix as an in-
put and not a feature representation of the data. For social
network data graph G represented by the binary adjacency
matrixA, spectral clustering techniques [42] utilize the eigen-
spectrum of A to perform clustering. The basic idea is to
view clustering as a graph partition problem, and divide the
graph into several disjoint subgraphs by only removing the
edges that connect nodes with small similarities. Algorithm
2 gives the standard clustering algorithm, and Algorithm 3
states the key steps of differential private spectral clustering
algorithm. Algorithm 3 differs from Algorithm 2 in that it
calls the publish routine in Algorithm 1 to obtain a differen-
tial private matrix which represents the structure of a social
network.
Algorithm 2: Spectral Clustering
Input: (1) Adjacency Matrix A ∈ Rn×n
(2) Number of clusters k
Output: Clusters C1, ..., Ck
1 Compute first k eigenvectors u1, ..,uk of A
2 Get matrix U ∈ Rn×k where ith column of U is ui
3 Obtain clusters by applying k−means clustering on matrix U
Algorithm 3: Differential Private Spectral Clus-
tering
Input: (1) adjacency matrix A ∈ Rn×n
(2) number of clusters k
(3) the number of random projections m < n
(4) variance for random noise σ2
Output: Clusters C1, ..., Ck
1 Compute a differential private matrix for social network A
by Â = Publish(A,m, σ2)
2 Compute first k eigenvectors u˜1, .., u˜k of Â
3 Get matrix U ∈ Rn×k where ith column of U is u˜i
4 Obtain clusters by applying k−means clustering on matrix U
In order to evaluate the utility of the published data for
clustering, we utilize normalize mutual information (NMI)
as a measure to evaluate the quality of clustering [17]. Al-
though Purity is a simpler evaluation measure, high purity
is easy to achieve for large number of clusters and cannot be
used to evaluate trade off between quality of clustering and
number of clusters. NMI allows us to evaluate this tradeoff
by normalizing mutual information I(ω;C) as described in
Equation 7.
NMI =
I(ω;C)
[H(ω) +H(C)]/2
, (7)
where H is entropy which measures the uniformity of the
distribution of nodes in a set of clusters, ω = w1, ..., wk is a
set of clusters and C = c1, ..., ck is a set of classes or ground
truth. NMI is bounded between 0 and 1, and the larger the
NMI, the better the clustering performance is.
We perform extensive experiments over the datasets to
evaluate our approach. We now give a stepwise explana-
tion of our evaluation protocol. Since we donot have ground
truth about the communities in the datasets, we employ an
exhaustive approach to evaluate clustering over the origi-
nal data and generate the ground truth communities. First,
for a given value of k we generate 5 different sets of clus-
ters from Algorithm 2, represented as Ci for i = 1, .., 5.
Since spectral clustering employs k−means, each set Ci can
have different cluster distributions. Therefore, to evaluate
the consistency in cluster distribution, NMI values are ob-
tained for
(
5
2
)
different pairs of sets represented as (Ci, Cj),
where i 6= j and average value is reported. Then, another 5
cluster sets are obtained through Algorithm 3, represented
as ωi for i = 1, ..., 5. Finally, to evaluate cluster sets ωi, NMI
values are obtained using Ci as the ground truth. In this case
NMI values are obtained for each pair (ωi, Cj)∀i, j ∈ 1, ..., 5
and average value is reported.
Since one of the advantages of the proposed approach is
its low sensitivity towards noise, we evaluate the clustering
results for three different values of σ, where σ = 0.1, 0.5 and
1. We note that these values of random noise were suggested
in [24], based on which we build our theoretical foundation.
For each σ, we evaluate clustering for two different number
of random projections m = 20, 200.
Figure 2, 3 and 4 shows NMI values obtained for four
different values of k, where symbol O represents the NMI
values obtained by using the original data. It is not surpris-
ing to observe that the clustering quality deteriorates with
increasing number of clusters. This is because the larger the
number of clusters, the more the challenging the problem
is. Overall, we observe that m = 200 yields significantly
better clustering performance than m = 20. When the ran-
dom perturbation is small (i.e. σ = 0.1), our approach with
m = 200 random projections yields similar clustering per-
formance as spectral clustering using the original data. This
is consistent with our theoretical result given in Theorem 2,
i.e. with sufficiently large number of random projections,
the approximation error in recovering the eigenvectors of
the original data can be as small as O(1/
√
n). Finally, we
observe that the clustering performance declines with larger
noise for random perturbation. However, even with random
noise as large as σ = 1, the clustering performance using
the differential private copy of the social network graph still
yield descent performance with NMI ≥ 0.70. This is again
consistent with our theoretical result: the approximation er-
ror of eigenvectors is O(σ/
√
n), and therefore will be small
as long as σ is significantly smaller than
√
n. Finally, Table
2 shows the memory required for the published data matrix
and the time required to compute the random projection
Dataset Facebook Pokec LiveJournal
Memory (MB)m = 200 4955 2612 6396
Memory (MB)m = 20 495 261 639
Time (sec)m = 200 150 97 211
Time (sec)m = 20 6.15 4.60 8.15
Table 2: Memory utilization and running time for
the proposed algorithm
Cluster 2 4 8 16
Facebook 9.1E − 8 8.8E − 7 4.1E − 6 1.3E − 5
LiveJournal 9.7E − 7 3.2E − 6 3.6E − 6 1.1E − 5
Pokec 1.1E − 7 3.5E − 6 5.8E − 6 2.6E − 5
Table 3: Clustering result (measured in NMI) using
LNPP Approach [43] for σ = 1
query over the graph matrix. It is not surprising to see that
both the memory requirement and running time increases
significantly with increasing number of random projections.
To show the variation in the cluster distribution, we select
clusters obtained from Facebook data for k = 200 and σ = 1.
Figure 5,6 and 7 shows the percentage of nodes present in
clusters obtained from the original and published data. Note
that perturbation has little to no effect over small number
of clusters as the distribution of nodes is identical.
We compare our results with an approach presented in
[43], which directly perturbs the eigenvector of the origi-
nal data by a Laplacian noise. We refer to this approach as
(LNPP) for short. We note that we did not compare to the
other approaches for differential private eigen decomposition
because they are computationally infeasible for the large so-
cial networks studied in our experiments. We implement the
LNPP mechanism and evaluate the clustering performance
by comparing it to the clustering results generated by the
original adjacency matrix. Table 3 gives NMI results using
LNPP over different datasets for σ = 1. It is clear that LNPP
performs significantly worse than the proposed algorithm in
clustering. Note that we did not include the clustering per-
formance of LNPP in Figure 2, 3 and 4 because of its poor
performance that basically overlaps with the horizonal axis.
4.3 Influential Node Analysis
Identifying information hubs in a social network is an im-
portant problem. An information hub refers to a node which
occupies a central position in the community and has a large
number of connections with other users. Such central nodes
play an important role in information diffusion. Advertis-
ing agencies, can utilize information about top-t influential
nodes for word-of-mouth advertisements [29]. Therefore, the
preservation of privacy of such influential nodes is impor-
tant.
Influential node analysis require information about the
eigen-spectrum of the social network graph. Eigen-vector
centrality (EVC) is a measure to quantify the influence of a
node in a social network [5]. EVC is mathematically related
to several other influence measures such as [22,25,40]. EVC
requires the computation of eigen-vectors and assigns ranks
to nodes according to their location in the most dominant
community. EVC of an adjacency matrix is defined as its
principle eigenvector. We employ principal component cen-
trality (PCC) which is based on EVC measure to rank the
2 4 8 160.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
k
N
M
I
 
 
O
m=200
m=20
(a) σ = 0.1
2 4 8 160.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
k
N
M
I
 
 
O
m=200
m=20
(b) σ = 0.5
2 4 8 160.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
k
N
M
I
 
 
O
m=200
m=20
(c) σ = 1
Figure 2: NMI values for Facebook
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Figure 3: NMI values for Live Journal
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Figure 4: NMI values for Pokec
nodes [23]. Let k denote the number of eigen vectors to be
computed. Let U denote the n×k matrix whose ith column
represents the ith eigenvector of an n× n adjacency matrix
A. Then PCC can be expressed as:
Ck =
√
((AUn×k)
⊙
(AUn×k)1k×1 (8)
Where Ck is an n × 1 vector containing PCC score of each
node. Nodes with highest PCC scores are considered the
influential nodes. Similar to the clustering approach, Algo-
rithm 4 gives the standard PCC algorithm, and Algorithm
5 states the key steps of differential private PCC algorithm.
We evaluate the utility preservation of the published data
by evaluating the accuracy with which influential nodes with
high ranks are identified. First, for a given value of k, eigen-
vectors corresponding to the k largest eigenvalues are com-
Algorithm 4: Principal Component Centrality
Input: (1) Adjacency Matrix A ∈ Rn×n
(2) number of top eigenvectors k
Output: PCC score Ck
1 Compute first k eigenvectors u1, ..,uk of A
2 Get matrix U ∈ Rn×k where ith column of U is ui
3 Obtain PCC scores Ck using Equation 8
puted from the original adjacency matrix and used to obtain
PCC scores of all the nodes in a graph using Algorithm 4
(denoted as Ck). Then, a second set of k eigenvectors is
computed from the published data i.e., after applying ma-
trix randomization using Algorithm 5. This second set is
then used to obtain another vector containing PCC scores
denoted as Cˆk. The original scores Ck and the published
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Figure 5: Cluster Distribution for Facebook Dataset
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Figure 6: Cluster Distribution for Live Journal Dataset
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Figure 7: Cluster Distribution for Pokec Dataset
Algorithm 5: Differential Private Principal Com-
ponent Centrality
Input: (1) adjacency matrix A ∈ Rn×n
(2) number of top eigenvectors k
(3) the number of random projections m < n
(4) variance for random noise σ2
Output: PCC score Cˆk
1 Compute a differential private matrix for social network A
by Â = Publish(A,m, σ2)
2 Compute first k eigenvectors u˜1, .., u˜k of Â
3 Get matrix U ∈ Rn×k where ith column of U is u˜i
4 Obtain PCC scores Cˆk using Equation 8
scores Cˆk are then compared in two different ways. For all
experiments, we compute PCC scores by varying the number
of eigenvectors in the range k = 2, 4, 8, 16.
In the first evaluation, we use Mean Square Error (MSE)
to compute the error between score values of Ck and Cˆk. We
report n×MSE in our study in order to alleviate the scaling
factor induced by the size of social networks. In the second
# of Eigenvectors 2 4 8 16
Facebook 2.6e−26 2.9e−4 0.021 0.013
Live Journal 4.0e−4 0.006 0.034 0.719
Pokec 3.0e−4 0.005 0.009 0.019
Table 4: n×MSE using the proposed approach
evaluation, we identify two sets of top t influential nodes
based on the PCC scores computed from the original data
as well as from the published data. We then evaluate the
performance of our algorithm by measuring the percentage
of overlapped nodes between these two sets. Table 4 gives the
values of Mean Square Error between PCC scores obtained
from the original and published data. We also compare these
results with the LNPP approach. For comparison, we show in
Table 5 the MSE results for baseline LNPP. It is clear that
the proposed algorithm yields significantly more accurate
estimation of PCC scores than LNPP. In most cases, the
proposed approach is 100 times more accurate than LNPP.
In the second evaluation, we measure the percentage of
nodes correctly identified as the top−t influential nodes.
# of Eigenvectors 2 4 8 16
Facebook 1.83 1.83 1.67 1.64
Live Journal 1.96 1.96 1.88 1.92
Pokec 1.79 1.63 1.62 1.55
Table 5: n×MSE using baseline LNPP
First, we obtain two sets T and Tˆ that contain the top−t
most influential nodes measured by the PCC scores given by
Ck and Cˆk. Then the percentage of nodes common to both T
and Tˆ is computed. We consider top 10, 100, 1000 and 10000
ranked nodes. Figure 8 shows the percentage of nodes cor-
rectly identified as the top−t influential nodes for the three
datasets. Figure 9 gives the results for LNPP approach. We
can see that for all case, the proposed algorithm is able to re-
cover at least 80% of the most influential nodes. In contrast,
LNPP fails to preserve the most influential nodes as the per-
centage of nodes correctly identified as the top−t influential
nodes is less than 1% for all cases.
5. CONCLUSION
Graphs obtained from large social networking platforms
can provide valuable information to the research community.
Public availability of social network graph data is problem-
atic due to the presence of sensitive information about in-
dividuals present in the data. In this paper present a pri-
vacy preserving mechanism for publishing social network
graph data which satisfies differential privacy guarantees.
We present a random matrix approach which can be uti-
lized for preserving the eigen-spectrum of a graph.
The random projection approach projects the adjacency
matrix A of a social network graph to lower dimensions by
multiplying A with a random projection matrix P . This ap-
proach satisfies differential privacy guarantees by random-
ization and maintains utility by adding low level of noise.
For evaluation purposes we use three different social network
graphs from Fcaebook, Live Journal and Pokec. We analyze
the impact of our perturbation approach by evaluating the
utility of the published data for two different applications
which require spectral information of a graph.
We consider clustering of social networks and identifica-
tion of influential nodes in a social graph. The results show
that even for high values of noise variance σ = 1 the clus-
tering quality given by NMI values is as low as 0.74 For
influential node discovery, the propose approach is able to
correctly recover at 80% of the most influential nodes.
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